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Control of norovirus outbreaks relies on enhanced hy-
giene measures, such as handwashing, surface cleaning, 
using disposable paper towels, and using separate toilets 
for sick and well persons. However, little is known about 
their effectiveness in limiting further spread of norovirus in-
fections. We analyzed norovirus outbreaks in 7 camps at an 
international scouting jamboree in the Netherlands during 
2004. Implementation of hygiene measures coincided with 
an 84.8% (95% predictive interval 81.2%–86.6%) reduction 
in reproduction number. This reduction was unexpectedly 
large but still below the reduction needed to contain a no-
rovirus outbreak. Even more stringent control measures are 
required to break the chain of transmission of norovirus.
G
astroenteritis is one of the most common causes of ill-
ness (1). Recent ﬁ  ndings indicate norovirus is the most 
common cause of gastroenteritis (2,3). Of all gastroenteritis 
outbreaks reported in the Netherlands during 2002, 54% 
were caused by norovirus (4). Norovirus is predominantly 
transmitted through the fecal–oral route, either indirectly 
through contaminated food or surfaces or directly from per-
son to person (5). It can be transmitted through small infec-
tious droplets (aerosols) after a vomiting episode (6,7) and 
can survive for a very long time in the environment (5,8). 
Most norovirus outbreaks are seen in settings where clus-
ters of vulnerable, susceptible persons live closely together, 
such as nursing homes, hospitals, and daycare centers (4), 
and in settings in which turnover of susceptible persons is 
high, such as hotels and cruise ships (9,10).
Norovirus infection can cause serious medical compli-
cations, such as dehydration, in persons with underlying ill-
ness (11). No antiviral treatment exists for norovirus infec-
tion, and although norovirus vaccines are in development 
(12), none are available yet. Early studies suggested that 
norovirus outbreaks could be contained by rapid imple-
mentation of enhanced hygiene measures, such as washing 
hands, thoroughly cleaning contaminated surfaces, avoid-
ing contact between sick and healthy persons, and request-
ing caretakers and cleaning staff to wear gloves and aprons 
(13–16). However, in nursing homes or on cruise ships, 
norovirus can cause consecutive outbreaks, even after 
implementation of strict hygiene protocols (9,17,18). No 
quantitative estimates exist of the results of such enhanced 
hygiene measures on reducing further transmission of no-
rovirus. To our knowledge, the effect of enhanced hygiene 
measures has not been investigated in randomized con-
trolled trials or in statistical analyses of outbreaks.
We investigated the effect of enhanced hygiene mea-
sures on reducing norovirus transmission during an out-
break. We measured the effectiveness of enhanced hygiene 
measures as the relative reduction in the reproduction num-
ber—deﬁ  ned as the average number of secondary cases 
caused by 1 typical case—in the absence of and after en-
hanced hygiene measures. The value of this reproduction 
number provides crucial information about transmission 
potential: if the reproduction number exceeds the threshold 
value of 1, the number of new cases will increase over time; 
if it is <1, the number of new cases will decline over time, 
and eventually the chain of transmission will break.
The time course of the reproduction number during an 
outbreak can be inferred from the epidemic curve (19,20). 
Enhanced Hygiene Measures 
and Norovirus Transmission during 
an Outbreak
Janneke C.M. Heijne,1 Peter Teunis,1 Gabriella Morroy, Clementine Wijkmans, Sandy Oostveen, 
Erwin Duizer, Mirjam Kretzschmar, and Jacco Wallinga
RESEARCH
24  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2009
Author afﬁ   liations: National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment, Bilthoven, the Netherlands (J.C.M. Heijne, P. Teu-
nis, E. Duizer, M. Kretzchmar, J. Wallinga); Emory University, At-
lanta, Georgia, USA (P. Teunis); Municipal Health Services “Hart 
voor Brabant,” ‘s-Hertogenbosch, the Netherlands (G. Morroy, C. 
Wijkmans, S. Oostveen); and University Medical Center Utrecht, 
Utrecht, the Netherlands (M. Kretzschmar, J. Wallinga)
DOI: 10.3201/1501.080299
1These authors contributed equally to this article.Hygiene Measures and Norovirus Transmission
We obtained a detailed epidemic curve of a norovirus out-
break at an international scout jamboree in the Netherlands 
from July 26 through August 10, 2004. This outbreak was 
ideally suited to estimating the effects of enhanced hygiene 
measures because the date enhanced hygiene measures 
began was recorded. Moreover, because the scouts were 
divided into 7 camps, the jamboree provided a natural ex-
periment in which the camps could be regarded as “experi-
mental units,” with varying durations between introduc-
tion of the virus and implementation of enhanced hygiene 
measures.
Methods
Data
An outbreak of norovirus infection occurred at an in-
ternational scout jamboree in the Netherlands during the 
summer of 2004 (21). Approximately 4,500 persons from 
32 countries attended this event. At the start of the scout 
jamboree on July 26, 2004, two participants became ill with 
symptoms of gastroenteritis. The outbreak affected at least 
326 persons with typical, generally mild symptoms of gas-
troenteritis (case-patients). Most ill persons experienced 
vomiting (258) and/or diarrhea (195). Ninety-two ill per-
sons visited a local ﬁ  rst aid tent; another 54 were admitted 
to a local hospital for rehydration.
The jamboree was held on a large site, ≈600 m × 1,000 
m. Jamboree participants were divided into 7 camps ac-
cording to age: 3 camps each for participants 11–14 and 
15–17 years of age and 1 camp for staff >18 years of age. 
The 7 camps were situated around a central ﬁ  eld for joint 
activities; most activities were organized within the camps. 
The camps were labeled A–G, according to the day the 
ﬁ  rst participants became sick. For 296 (91%) of 326 case-
patients, the camp label was known (Figure 1, Table).
On July 29 (day 3 of the jamboree), the Municipal 
Health Service “Hart voor Brabant” in ’s-Hertogenbosch 
provided advice on enhanced hygiene measures (22), in-
structed participants about proper hand hygiene and use of 
soap pumps and disposable paper towels, and assigned sep-
arate toilets for sick participants. In addition, the Municipal 
Health Service provided guidelines for cleaning toilets and 
contaminated surfaces with a 1,000-ppm chlorine solution. 
Sick participants were instructed to go to a ﬁ  rst aid tent. 
Sick participants were not allowed to prepare food until 
3 days after their last symptoms. Persons working in the 
jamboree’s ﬁ  eld hospital were instructed to wear gloves, 
aprons, and surgical masks and to minimize the number of 
patients per nurse. The scout jamboree ended on August 5.
Norovirus was epidemiologically implicated as the 
causative agent (21) of the outbreak and was conﬁ  rmed in 
stool samples through a standard reverse transcription-PCR 
protocol (23). Typing of 7 samples from case-patients in 
whom symptoms ﬁ  rst developed 7–9 days after the out-
break began resulted in 3 norovirus genotypes: 2 samples 
typed as norovirus genotype GI.4, 1 sample typed as geno-
type GI.5, and 4 samples typed as genotype GII.4–2004. 
We did not detect any multiple infections.
During the outbreak, the Municipal Health Service as-
sessed the number of new cases from typical gastroenteri-
tis symptoms self-reported by participants and staff. After 
the jamboree, participants and staff were given a question-
naire asking them to report to the Municipal Health Service 
whether gastroenteritis had developed within a week after 
departure. The questionnaire asked the date of symptom 
onset, symptoms, camp label, and hospital admission.
Reproduction Number
Estimation of Reproduction Numbers
We estimated the reproduction number for every case 
during the norovirus outbreak at the jamboree. Using the 
date of symptom onset for each case, we applied statisti-
cal methods to reconstruct likely patterns of who infected 
whom (online Technical Appendix 1, available from www.
cdc.gov/EID/content/15/1/24-Techapp1.pdf). We ﬁ  rst 
calculated the difference in day of symptom onset for all 
combinations of case pairs. To calculate the probability of 
transmission between any pair of cases, we needed infor-
mation from the distribution of generation times (deﬁ  ned as 
the time between day of symptom onset in a secondary case 
and day of onset in its primary case) (19,24). To estimate 
the generation time distribution for norovirus infections, 
we used observations of generation times from several 
large norovirus outbreaks in child daycare centers in Swe-
den during 1999 (25). These generation times were well 
described by a gamma distribution (Figure 2), for which 
the parameters were estimated by the method of maximum 
likelihood (online Technical Appendix 1). The frequency 
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Figure 1. Epidemic curve of an outbreak of norovirus at an 
international scout jamboree in the Netherlands, starting July 26, 
2004 (day 0).RESEARCH
distribution of generation times was used to assign a likeli-
hood of transmission for any pair of cases, allowing esti-
mation of the transmission probabilities. We then used a 
powerful statistical sampling algorithm to generate a large 
sample of plausible transmission patterns (for technical 
details, see online Technical Appendix 1). The expected 
value of the reproduction number for a speciﬁ  c case was 
the sum of all transmission probabilities of outgoing infec-
tious contacts to all other cases in the outbreak. For cases 
in which symptoms began the same day, we calculated the 
mean minimum and maximum values of the reproduction 
number. For the entire sample of transmission probabili-
ties, we obtained the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles for these 3 
metrics as predictive intervals.
Host Population Structure and Pathogen Genotype
We incorporated additional information about the camp 
label of almost all case-patients and the pathogen genotype 
for 7 case-patients into the estimation procedure by adding 
a ”weight” to the transmission probabilities between pairs 
of cases. Here we considered 2 extreme cases for mixing 
between camps. The ﬁ  rst extreme case was homogeneous 
mixing between all participants of the jamboree, as we as-
sumed in the analysis described above; to achieve this, we 
assigned a weight of 1 to any pair of cases. The second 
extreme case was mixing within camps only and no mixing 
between camps. In this instance, the transmission probabil-
ities for pairs of case-patients that stayed in different camps 
were assigned a weight of 0, and the transmission prob-
abilities for pairs of case-patients that stayed in the same 
camp were given a weight of 1. The transmission probabili-
ties for pairs of cases with known different genotypes were 
assigned a weight of 0, and the transmission probabilities 
for pairs of cases with known identical genotypes were as-
signed a weight of 1.
Expected Time Course of Reproduction Number
If the enhanced hygiene measures resulted in a sud-
den decline in transmission, the expected decline of the 
reproduction number would be gradual. Four factors deter-
mined the expected time course: the day enhanced hygiene 
measures began, the cumulative frequency distribution of 
generation times, the reproduction number without en-
hanced hygiene measures, and the relative reduction of the   
reproduction number attributed to hygiene measures. We 
express the reproduction number as a function of these 4 
factors (online Technical Appendix 1) and ﬁ  tted this func-
tion to every sampled time course of the mean reproduc-
tion number for days 0–5, with least squares regression to 
obtain point estimates and 95% predictive intervals for the 
parameters describing the reproduction number in the ab-
sence of hygiene measures and relative reduction of the re-
production number resulting from the hygiene measures.
Testing of the Estimation Procedures
We tested the estimation procedure by simulating 
epidemic curves with known reproduction numbers. The 
interval estimates for reproduction numbers covered the 
actual values for days 0–7. We detected a slight down-
ward bias for the estimated value of reproduction numbers 
and a slight downward bias for the estimated realtive re-
duction of reproduction numbers after implementation of 
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Table. New norovirus cases during outbreak at international scout jamboree, the Netherlands, starting on Jul 26, 2004 (day 0), by day 
of symptom onset and camp label
Camp, no. new cases/d 
Day of 
onset
A
(n = 485) 
B
(n = 721) 
C
(n = 729) 
D
(n = 499) 
E
(n = 735) 
F
(n = 825*) 
G
(n = 506)  Unknown 
Total 
(n = 4,500)
0 110000002
1 101000024
2 02211301 1 0
3 27902101 2 2
4 34212240 1 8
5 0 1 0 121122 1 9
6 0 1 2 322001 2 0
7 2 1 9 1 4 23363 5 2
8 35822110 2 2
9 7 10 14 0 2 10 24 2 69
1 0 54320 1 6 8 1 1 4 9
1 1 32410113 1 5
1 2 41421102 1 5
1 3 001000113
1 4 001001013
1 5 001011003
Total† 31 77 68 15 17 41 47 30 326
*This number is estimated. 
†Overall attack rate: 7.2. Attack rate by camp: A, 6.4; B, 10.7; C, 9.3; D, 3.0; E, 2.3; F, 5.0; G, 9.3. Hygiene Measures and Norovirus Transmission
enhanced hygiene measures, indicating that the values ob-
tained by the estimation procedure are conservative (online 
Technical Appendix 2, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/15/1/24-Techapp2.pdf).
Results
The estimated reproduction numbers decreased over 
time as the norovirus outbreak spread through the interna-
tional scout jamboree (Figure 3). We estimated an initial 
reproduction number of 7.26 secondary cases per primary 
case (95% predictive interval 5.26–9.25); 5 days after the 
enhanced hygiene protocol began, the estimated reproduc-
tion number dropped below 1 (Figure 3, black diamonds). 
Under the hypothesis that transmission potential decreased 
abruptly when enhanced hygiene measures began, we esti-
mated a reproduction number of 14.05 secondary cases per 
primary case (95% predictive interval 9.96–17.98) without 
enhanced hygiene measures and a reproduction number of 
2.13 secondary cases per primary case (95% predictive in-
terval 1.88–2.40) with enhanced hygiene measures (Figure 
3, black solid line). This decrease corresponded to a rela-
tive reduction in reproduction number of 84.8% (95% pre-
dictive interval 81.2%–86.6%).
The disease attack rate varied among different camps, 
from 2.3% to 10.7%; overall attack rate was 7.2% (Table). 
For camps A and B, the estimated time course of reproduc-
tion number was initially high for the 2 index case-patients 
(Figure 4, black diamonds). Repeating the analysis with ad-
ditional information about the host population structure and 
pathogen genotypes resulted in similar point estimates of 
the reproduction numbers (Figure 4, gray boxes) but with 
narrower predictive intervals. The value of the initial re-
production number in each camp followed a time course 
consistent with 85% reduced transmission when enhanced 
hygiene measures were implemented (Figure 4, black solid 
lines), indicating the time course of the reproduction num-
bers did not depend on the time of introduction of norovirus 
in the camp—because this differed between camps—but on 
the time the enhanced hygiene protocol began, which was 
identical for all camps.
Discussion
We have shown that during an outbreak of norovirus, 
implementation of enhanced hygiene measures coincided 
with an 85% reduction of norovirus transmission, from 
14.05 secondary cases per primary case before enhanced 
hygiene measures to 2.13 secondary cases per primary case 
after enhanced hygiene measures. This estimate is consis-
tent with the time course of reproduction numbers in dif-
ferent camps in which infection was introduced at different 
times. Our estimates conﬁ  rm the alleged high epidemic po-
tential of norovirus and suggest that the enhanced hygiene 
measures were not sufﬁ  cient to reduce the reproduction 
number below the threshold value of 1. This estimate ex-
plains why the number of new cases per day continued to 
increase and why norovirus infection spread to new camps, 
even after implementation of enhanced hygiene measures. 
It is tempting to speculate that our ﬁ  ndings could be ex-
trapolated to other hygiene measures to explain the typical 
pattern in several subsequent norovirus outbreaks on cruise 
ships and in hotels (9,26,27).
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Figure 2. Generation time distribution for norovirus infections. 
Generation time is the time between onset of symptoms in 
successive case-patients. The histogram gives the relative 
frequency in norovirus outbreaks in Sweden in 1999 (25); the black 
line indicates the maximum-likelihood ﬁ  t of the gamma distribution.
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Figure 3. Time course of the reproduction number for norovirus 
at an international scout jamboree, starting July 26, 2004 (day 
0), in the Netherlands. Black diamonds show the mean value 
for the reproduction number over all sampled transmission 
matrices; vertical lines, mean minimum and maximum values for 
the reproduction number over all sampled transmission matrices. 
The dark gray area shows the uncertainty range (0.025 and 0.975 
quantiles) in the mean reproduction number; light gray area, the 
uncertainty range (0.025 and 0.975 quantiles) of the maximum and 
minimum estimates of the reproduction number. The solid black 
line represents the ﬁ   tted time course of reproduction numbers 
if decrease in the mean reproduction number results from an 
instantaneous decline in transmission when enhanced hygiene 
measures began; dashed line, the threshold value of 1, below 
which the outbreak was controlled.RESEARCH
The estimation procedure for the time course of the 
reproduction number has several limitations. It requires a 
frequency distribution for the generation time, which may 
be unknown for many diseases that are less well studied 
than norovirus. The procedure also requires reporting of 
symptom onset of case-patients over intervals on the order 
of the mean generation time or smaller. Here, because the 
mean generation time was 3.6 days, we cannot use weekly 
reports of time of symptom onset. The procedure also re-
quires a large outbreak so the effects of chance events on 
the course of the epidemic are minimized. Small outbreaks 
would lead to estimates of reproduction numbers that are 
highly uncertain and have questionable value for making 
generalizations about transmission.
Our main result is that the observed decline in the re-
production number coincided with implementation of en-
hanced hygiene measures. This extrapolation is highly sug-
gestive of a causal relationship, which implies that hygiene 
measures can effectively reduce transmission of norovirus. 
However, several alternatives can explain the declining re-
production number, as discussed below.
First, the decrease in reproduction number may be due 
to chance events. Here we explicitly estimated the repro-
duction numbers from times of symptom onset and the gen-
eration time distribution for norovirus infections, whereas 
earlier work relied on transforming epidemic curves to re-
production numbers (19,20). The tests of our explicit esti-
mation procedure indicate that the interval estimates cover 
the actual values of reproduction numbers and the reduced 
reproduction numbers after the implementation of hygiene 
measures. The predictive interval for the relative reduc-
tion of 81.2%–86.6% clearly shows the change is statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant because it excludes the null hypothesis of 
a change of 0%. The tests also indicate a slight bias in the 
estimated values toward lower values, which suggests that 
the estimated 85% reduction after enhanced hygiene mea-
sures began should be treated as a conservative estimate. 
Therefore, the reduction in transmission is highly unlikely 
to be due to chance.
Second, it might be that jamboree participants differed 
in susceptibility, and the pool of highly susceptible persons 
was depleted during the ﬁ  rst days of the outbreak. Howev-
er, preexisting immunity for the genotypes involved seems 
highly unlikely: GI.5 and GI.4 rarely are detected in Europe, 
and the GII.4–2004 genotype caused a large epidemic during 
the winter after the jamboree (28). The number of persons in-
fected before implementation of enhanced hygiene measures 
was smaller than the total number of case-patients, and the 
total number of case-patients was smaller than the number 
of jamboree participants. Depletion of susceptible persons or 
different susceptibility is highly unlikely to explain the sud-
den decrease in transmission around day 3 of the outbreak.
Third, the decline in reproduction number could be 
because many infections were asymptomatic and many 
symptomatic cases were not reported. The request to re-
port any symptoms might not have reached all participants 
because of the event’s large size and because participants 
came from many different countries. During norovirus out-
breaks, asymptomatic cases occur; in almost half of the 
outbreaks in the Netherlands during 2002, stool samples 
from >1 healthy persons tested positive for norovirus (4). 
Volunteer and outbreak studies demonstrate that 30% of 
collected stool specimens of exposed, asymptomatic per-
sons were positive for norovirus (29–31). However, both 
the proportion of asymptomatic infections and the report-
ing rate, as long as they remain constant, do not inﬂ  uence 
the value of the reproduction number because the reproduc-
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Figure 4. Time course of the reproduction number for norovirus 
for 7 camps of an international scout jamboree. Black diamonds 
show the mean value of the reproduction number without additional 
information about population structure and genotypes. Gray boxes 
show the mean value of the reproduction number when additional 
information about population structure and genotypes is used. The 
vertical lines show the mean minimum and maximum reproduction 
number over all sampled transmission matrices. The solid black line 
represents the time course of reproduction numbers if decrease 
in the mean reproduction number results from an instantaneous 
decline in transmission when enhanced hygiene measures begin. 
The camps are in order of the day of symptom onset of the ﬁ  rst 
case-patient. Top panels indicate ﬁ  rst introduction, bottom panels 
the last introduction.Hygiene Measures and Norovirus Transmission
tion number is estimated as the ratio of the number of sec-
ondary cases to the number of primary cases: both the pro-
portion of asymptomatic infections and the reporting rate 
affect both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio, 
thereby canceling out in this calculation. Therefore, how 
the proportion of asymptomatic infections or the reporting 
rate would have resulted in a similar decline in reproduc-
tion number in the different camps is difﬁ  cult to imagine.
Fourth, different genotypes of norovirus could have 
spread at different times during the outbreak. From geno-
typing data of 7 cases of the norovirus outbreak during the 
jamboree, we know that 3 different norovirus genotypes 
circulated during this outbreak from genogroup I and II. 
Recent work (32) showed ﬁ  rst signs of a different viral load, 
which could indicate different transmissibility and different 
generation times between genogroup I and genogroup II. 
However, all genotyped strains were found during days 7–9 
of the outbreak; although we cannot rule out the possibility 
that genotype replacement occurred, the most transmissible 
type is highly unlikely to have dominated during the ﬁ  rst 3 
days before giving way to less transmissible types.
Finally, a change of the generation time distribution 
during the outbreak could explain the decline in reproduc-
tion number. The method we used to estimate the time 
course of reproduction number depends crucially on a cor-
rect speciﬁ  cation of the generation time distribution. Here 
we obtained this distribution from a study of a norovirus 
outbreak in child daycare centers in Sweden (25) and es-
timated that the generation time distribution peaked at 2.6 
days (Figure 2). This estimation agrees with results from 
volunteer studies in which adults showed a peak in virus 
shedding at 1–3 days postchallenge (31). Further, this peak 
agrees with the time between exposure and symptom on-
set of 2 days in primary-school children during a norovi-
rus outbreak after a vomiting event (6), whereas 80% of 
case-patients reported vomiting during the scout jamboree. 
Overall, the most plausible explanation for the decrease in 
reproduction number is implementation of enhanced hy-
giene measures.
We have quantitatively estimated the effectiveness of 
enhanced hygiene measures in containing an outbreak of 
norovirus. Because the reproduction number did not fall be-
low the threshold value of 1, implementation of the hygiene 
measures was not sufﬁ  cient to effectively break the chain 
of person-to-person transmission of norovirus during this 
outbreak. To contain an outbreak of norovirus, more rigor-
ous interventions are required. These might range from bet-
ter compliance with hygiene protocols to strict isolation of 
case-patients and quarantine of their contacts. We recom-
mend quantifying the effectiveness of interventions against 
norovirus to provide the necessary evidence to justify use 
of existing hygiene protocols during outbreaks and to direct 
the development of better intervention measures. Although 
such quantifying would require analysis of more norovirus 
outbreaks with different sets of intervention measures, it 
would enable identiﬁ  cation of the best possible interven-
tion strategies to control the spread of one of the most com-
mon pathogens of humans.
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